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Abstract
This paper examines the direct democratic institutions within the German
political system. In a first step, direct democratic elements are analyzed in a
historical context covering a period from the Weimar Republic to and beyond
German Reunification. In a second step, the direct democratic instruments
provided in the Basic Law and the various state constitutions are analyzed
in their respective legal context whereby the focus lies on the Länder level.
Finally, the main points of criticism of the current state of direct democracy
in Germany – and their remedies – are to be outlined.
The historical analysis shows that the “Weimar experience” – contrary to
commonly held beliefs – cannot provide the reason for not implementing
direct democratic elements in the Basic Law after World War II. The compar-
ative legal examination of the Länder constitutions identifies three institu-
tional types of direct democracy – a two-tier-model, a three-tier-model and
a hybrid model – which are presented in detail. The criticism of the current
state of direct democracy in Germany concerns formal, material, and pro-
cedural requirements and restrictions that have to be met in order to make
a referendum succeed. The signature quorums are comparatively high and
therefore are in danger to exert a prohibitive effect. Moreover, the approval
and participation quorums required by some constitutions might undermine
one key contribution of direct democracy – the political discussion. The re-
quirement of a reasoned and detailed draft bill – if interpreted too narrowly –
may ask too much of laymen. The more or less comprehensive preclusion
of budget-affecting issues virtually excludes any referendums. The parlia-
ment’s right to submit a counter-proposal might be misused as a means of
splitting of votes – in particular where the voter is allowed to cast only a
single yes-vote.
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I. Introduction
After the peaceful revolution that finally led to the collapse of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) and to the German Reunification, a revision of
thinking took place: Whereas direct participation of the people was strongly
stigmatized after World War II, the success of the citizens’ movement led to
a boost of direct democracy: at first in the “new Bundesländer” only, later
in western Germany as well. These days, direct democratic institutions are
an inherent part of German politics in the Länder and on the municipal level.
This is in sharp contrast to the federal level: The Basic Law (Grundgesetz
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949) does not provide
any direct democratic institutions – exceptions are discussed in section 4 –
even though a large section of the population would appreciate a stronger
influence on national politics.1
It is the aim of this paper to present an overview of the political and legal
debates on this controversial issue and of the (mal)functions of direct demo-
cratic institutions in the Länder. Therefore, an overview of direct democratic
institutions in German history is presented in the next part and is followed
by a description of the implementation of direct democratic elements on the
federal, Länder- and municipal level. Subsequently, Part IV sums up the crit-
icism on the current state of direct democracy, while part V finally contains
some concluding remarks.
II. Historical Context
There are two reasons to shed some light on the historical context of direct
democratic elements: (1) The applicable provisions of direct democratic in-
stitutions in the constitutions of the German Länder can be traced back to
the respective regulations in the Weimar Constitution; (2) The “Weimar ex-
perience” was – and to a lesser extent still is – a recurring argument against
direct democracy in Germany. This section is structured as follows: In a first
step, direct democratic institutions, their application, and their influence dur-
1 A recent poll showed that 76 percent of the respondents would appreciate a popu-
lar referendum on the federal level (see http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-
analysen/bundesweit/umfragen/aktuell/grosse-mehrheit-fuer-mehr-volksentscheide-
knappe-mehrheit-erwartet-dass-schwarz-gelb-durchhaelt/ [accessed March 2, 2011]).
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ing Weimar Republic and World War II are presented. In a second step, the
question why the Basic Law does not offer more opportunities for a direct in-
volvement of the people should be answered by ruling out the deliberations
of the framers of the Basic Law during the drafting process and the politi-
cal parties’ stance on direct democratic elements in general. This historical
overview is to be complemented with a brief discussion of the most recent
trends in direct democracy since reunification.
1. Direct Democratic Elements during the Weimar
Republic and the Third Reich
After the tumultuous period of the German Revolution in November 1918
which finally led to the proclamation of the republic and the Kaiser’s en-
forced abdication, general election were held on January 19, 1919, to create
a national assembly, which was entrusted with framing a new constitution.
The Constitution of the German Reich – commonly known as the Weimar
Constitution (WRV) – became effective on August 11, 1919, and was the
first democratic constitution on German soil; the highly controversial Art.
73–76 WRV even provided direct participation of the people during the leg-
islative process – mainly integrated as an element of checks and balances
between the executive and the legislative branches of government, but also
within the legislative body itself between the Reichstag (house of people’s
representatives) and the Reichsrat (house of Länder):
• Art. 73 (1) WRV stated that a law passed by the Reichstag had to be
presented in a referendum if the Reichspräsident (head of state) decided
so, within the period of a month.
• Art. 73 (2) WRV required a law whose proclamation had been suspended
by a minimum of one third of the members of the Reichstag had to be
presented in a referendum if one twentieth of the enfranchised voters
demanded so.
• Art. 73 (3) WRV stipulated that a referendum had to be held if one tenth
of the enfranchised voters demanded a draft law to be presented.
• The Reichsrat was entitled to object to laws passed by the Reichstag. If
this objection could not be resolved, the Reichspräsident at his discre-
tion could call for a referendum or let the draft law die. If the Reichstag
2
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voted to overrule the Reichsrat’s objection by a two-thirds majority, the
Reichspräsident was obligated to either bring the law into force or to call
for a referendum (Art. 74 (3) WRV).
• If the Reichstag decided on a constitutional amendment against the Re-
ichsrat’s objection, the Reichspräsident might not proclaim the amend-
ment if the Reichsrat, within a period of two weeks, demanded a ple-
biscite to be held (Art. 76 (3) WRV).
Additionally, a referendum also had to be held for the transfer of state
territory or the formation of new states within the Reich. In any of the afore-
mentioned cases, the referendums provided for in the Weimar Constitution
were only facultative ones. As important as these opportunities offered in
Art. 73–76 WRV were the restrictions they imposed: Pursuant to Art. 75
WRV, a referendum was successful only if the majority of enfranchised vot-
ers participated (participation quorum), constitutional amendments had to
be approved by a majority of those entitled to vote (approval quorum); Art.
73 (4) WRV precluded any people-initiated referendums concerning budget,
taxation laws or pay regulations (financial taboo).
In view of the political and social tensions during the Weimar Republic, the
number of referendums in the Reich was surprisingly low. Not a single plea
for referendum was initiated by either the Reichspräsident, the Reichstag or
the Reichsrat – which reflects the general impression that the state organs
perceived the direct democratic legislation as a “procedure of second quality”
(Schiffers 2002: 67).2 The people itself was slightly more active and filed a
petition for a referendum in eight cases out of which three were not admitted
because of the financial taboo, one was accepted unaltered by the Reichstag
(therefore, there was no need for a referendum), one was no longer pursued
by its initiators, one failed to overcome the 10%-signature threshold, there-
fore only two petitions actually led to a referendum. Neither of them had
been successful, since neither the referendum for the expropriation of royal
houses (Fürstenenteignung) in 1926 nor the referendum against the Young-
Plan in 1929 passed the threshold of the majority of enfranchised voters
to participate. However, in both cases more than 90% of the participating
voters opted in favor of the relevant law.
2 The reluctance of the political parties was further demonstrated by the fact that the corre-
sponding implementing statute had not been enacted until June 27, 1921.
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On July 14, 1933, Hitler – having seized power in 1933 – enacted the Law
on Plebiscites (Gesetz über Volksabstimmungen) whose succinct provisions
changed the aspect of direct democracy in a fundamental way. Whereas the
direct democratic institutions in the Weimar Constitution had an oppositional
or an arbitrable function, they became instruments of the government, since
the Law on Plebiscites put the decision on date and question of a referendum
at the government’s own discretion.3 Therefore, the referendums were in
danger to be used to pass a law by acclamation. Far more influential than
the Law on Plebiscites, however, was the change in the political environment
under the Nazi dictatorship: The monopolization of the formation of politi-
cal will under the NSDAP, the stigmatization and the harassment dissenters
were subjected to, the clear violation of democratic principles by not granting
the secrecy of the ballot, suggestive questioning etc. – all this thwarted free-
dom of expression (Jung 1995: 28ff.). Bugiel (1991: 248) further questions
the legality of the three cases of plebiscitary referendums under the Nazi
regime: Contrary to § 1 VAbstG which stated the admissibility of plebiscites
on intended measures, the plebiscites on the withdrawal from the League
of Nations (Austritt aus dem Völkerbund, 1933), head of state (Staatsober-
haupt, 1934), and the annexation of Austria (Anschluss Österreichs, 1938),
were held after the respective decisions were made.
In accordance with prevailing doctrine one has to conclude that the “Wei-
mar experience” is limited to the unsatisfactory procedure the Weimar Con-
stitution provided. The participation quorum – and the approval quorum for
constitutional amendments – favors the opponents of an initiative since it
provides strong incentives to abstain from voting which is cheap – cheaper
than the mobilization of supporters to vote against a bill – and it offers
the possibility to misstate all non-voters as opponents (Schiffers 2002: 72).
However, one has to re-emphasize that the use during Weimar Republic and
the Third Reich cannot discredit the elements of direct democracy. Following
Pestalozza (1981: 29), one could hold that if the misuse of the Reichstag’s
election could not inhibit the framers of the constitution to improve the elec-
toral regime, the misuse of referendums during Weimar Republic and Third
3 On the other hand, § 2 VAbstG required only the majority of the votes therefore dropping
the participation quorum required in Art. 75 WRV. In this respect, the new provision led to
an easing of restrictions.
4
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Reich cannot be the reason to preclude any direct democratic elements on a
federal level.
2. Direct Democratic Elements in Post-War
Germany
Contrary to commonly held beliefs, it was not the aforementioned “Weimar
experience” which inhibited the framers of the constitution from including
direct democratic elements within the Basic Law. As more recent research
shows (see Jung 1994; Wiegand 2006: 166ff.; Bachmann 2009), the framers
were more heavily influenced by the Cold War: In May, 1948, the SED,
the Socialistic Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands), started a petition for a referendum “for the German Unity” as part of
its national-patriotic agitation strategy aiming at the German unification un-
der the Soviet model (Braun 1993). Despite its questionable lawfulness and
the missing admission by the military governments of the Western Zones,
the initiators succeeded to collect some three million signatures (approx. 7%
of those entitled to vote) in the Western Zones. The unexpected success of
these politically undesired forces resulted in a “quarantine-concept”, as Jung
(1994: 329) puts it, i. e. the renouncement – at least until the political sys-
tem of (West-)Germany has been consolidated – on any direct democratic
elements on the federal level. In the Länder, however, direct democratic ele-
ments were enshrined in all constitutions that came into force in 1946/1947.4
The constitutions that came into force after 1949 were more reluctant either
because of the influence of the Basic Law or because of specific political cir-
cumstances.5
In the following decades, there were no serious attempts to enshrine direct
democratic elements in the Basic Law (Bachmann 2009: 110), and in 1976,
the “Enquete Commission” set up by the German Bundestag found that the
inclusion of referendums and other direct democratic institutions was not
to be recommended, since these direct democratic elements could under-
mine the functioning and legitimation of representative institutions (Bugiel
1991: 57ff.; Wiegand 2006: 251ff.).
4 For a detailed list of direct democratic elements in the state constitutions after World War II,
see Wiegand 2006: 181ff..
5 See Wiegand 2006: 181.
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In the late 1980s, decreasing turnout rates raised awareness of the dis-
enchantment with politics of large proportions of the population; further-
more, low turnout in elections raised doubts about the procedural legitimacy
of representative democracy (Weixner 2002: 35ff.). These developments
sparked new interest in direct democracy since it was deemed a possible so-
lution to these problems (Fijalkowski 1986; Weixner 2002: 35ff.; Neumann
2009: 76ff.). Direct democracy was further buoyed by the German Reuni-
fication: The peaceful collapse of the GDR, influenced most importantly by
citizens’ movements, showed the democratic maturity of the German people
(Rux 2008: 63ff.).6 Meanwhile, the revision of the Schleswig-Holstein Con-
stitution in the wake of the “Barschel-Affair”7 strengthened controls on the
executive branch of government by introducing more permissive provisions
of direct democracy (Kellmann 2005: 285ff.).
3. Developments of Direct Democracy Since
Reunification
The issue of direct democracy on the federal level was once again heavily
disputed in course of the discussion of the Joint Constitutional Commission
(Gemeinsame Verfassungskommission). Parties of the political left (SPD,
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen; PDS/Linke) submitted various proposals; however,
all plans to adopt more permissive provisions of direct democracy in the Basic
Law failed because they could not secure the required two-thirds majority,
mainly due to the reluctance of the parties of the political right (CDU/CSU,
FDP) (Wiegand 2006: 271ff.).
Yet, the stagnation on the federal level was in sharp contrast with the devel-
opment on the Länder level. Under the influence of the revised Constitution
of Schleswig-Holstein providing a broader scope of direct democratic institu-
tions and with reference to the positive influence of the citizens’ movements
on the peaceful collapse of the GDR, the “new Bundesländer” (Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia) all
6 On the impact of German Reunification on direct democracy, see Klages and Paulus 1996.
7 The Barschel-Affair was one of the biggest political scandals in German post-war history.
A Spiegel-magazine report revealed that Mr. Barschel, then-incumbent prime minister of
Schleswig-Holstein, had ordered his media advisor to spy on the sex life of Mr. Engholm, his
rival in the upcoming state elections.
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adopted comparatively permissive and innovative provisions of direct demo-
cratic instruments (Wiegand 2006: 266ff.).8
On the federal level, a further attempt was made in 2002, when the incum-
bent coalition of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen introduced another plan to
implement direct democratic elements on the federal level. This proposal
– whose rather restrictive provisions were criticized by relevant special in-
terest groups (e. g. “Mehr Demokratie e.V.”) – was supported by a majority
of mainly leftist members of the Bundestag, however, it failed to overcome
the two-thirds majority threshold (Wiegand 2009: 451ff.).
III. Legal Context
4. Direct Democratic Elements in the Basic Law
The Basic Law stipulates in its Art. 20 (2) that the people shall exercise
the state authority which is entirely vested in it not only by elections but
also by “other votes”.9 However, only one specific provision of the Basic
Law envisages the latter way of exercising state authority: For revisions of
the existing division into Länder, Art. 29 GG requires a federal law, which
must be confirmed by referendum. In addition, Art. 146 GG states that
“[t]his Basic Law […] shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution
freely adopted by the German people takes effect.” But this highly contested
provision might not be considered as an element of direct democracy within
the Basic Law (Böckenförde 2006: 114).
Although there is some agreement that the Basic Law is open for other
means of direct democracy, there is no consensus whether their introduction
8 With the exception of Thuringia, all new Bundesländer opted for a three-tier or a hybrid model
of people’s legislation (cf. section 5.1 on the following page), the signature quorums required
for a popular initiative were – and still are – comparatively low, Brandenburg’s Art. 76 (3)
BBLV even provides the participation of all its residents (including foreigners) in popular
initiatives. However, regarding the signature quorums required in the petition phase and the
approval quorums required in the referendum phase, the new Bundesländer converged on
the West German standard.
9 Art. 20 (2) GG reads: “All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised
by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive
and judicial bodies”. Regarding the coordinate conjunction connecting “elections” and “other
votes”, it should be clear that the only inference one can draw is the normative equality
of representative and direct democracy (Wittreck 2009). Nonetheless, there is widespread
misconception of the practical predominance of parliamentary legislation as a constitutional
decision for its primacy.
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requires an amendment of the Basic Law or whether an ordinary law would
be sufficient.10 According to Bugiel (1991: 443), one side argues that Art.
20 (2) GG has to be read as an authorization of the legislative body to do
so whereas the other side implies an exhaustive regulation of the Basic Law
through the existence of Art. 29 GG as a specific case. This latter view is
convincingly contradicted by Böckenförde (2006: 115) who argues that it is
unnecessary to mention “other votes” in Art. 20 (2) GG if the introduction
of additional elements of direct democracy would require a constitutional
amendment anyway. Bugiel (1991: 119) further shows that Art. 29 GG is
not a specific case of Art. 20 (2) GG, since they do not refer to the same
addressee. Whereas Art. 20 (2) GG refers to the collectivity of citizens on
the federal level, Art. 29 GG instead focuses on the citizens of the affected
Länder only.
5. Direct Democratic Elements in the Constitutions
of the Länder
By now, all Länder provide for direct participation of the people in one way
or the other. As outlined above, Art. 20 (2) GG explicitly mentions “other
votes” as one means to exercise state authority; therefore, those elements
of direct democracy are in line with the general principles set forth in the
Basic Law, as required by Art. 28 (1) GG.11 In this section the various direct
democratic institutions, their procedures, and their importance for legislation
are to be presented.
5.1. People’s Legislation
Although all constitutions of the Länder offer the people to get involved in
the process of legislation, there is no uniformity in procedure: Some Länder
offer a two-tier approach only12, in others – particularly in most of the newly
10 For a detailed summary of these debates, see Bugiel 1991: 443ff..
11 Art. 28 (1) GG reads: “The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles
of a republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning
of this Basic Law. […]”.
12 Baden-Wurttemberg (Art. 59, 60, and 64 BWLV; BWVAbstG), Bavaria (Art. 71–75 BYLV; Art.
63–88 BYLWG), Berlin (Art. 59, 62, 63, and 100 BELV; BEAbstG), Bremen (Art. 70, 71, and
125 HBLV; HBGVV), Hesse (Art. 123 and 124 HELV; HEVoBegG), Lower Saxony (Art. 48
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formed states of the former GDR – a three-tier approach is mandatory13,
and a third group of Länder permits both ways14.
5.1.1. Two-Tier-Model
The two-tier-model subdivides into the Volksbegehren (hereafter referred to
as “petition for a referendum”) and the Volksentscheid (hereafter “referen-
dum”). However, the petition for a referendum is preceded by a formal and
material examination of admissibility. Therefore, in a first step, the required
number of signatures for the application of admission for a referendum (Zu-
lassungsantrag auf Volksbegehren) has to be collected, whereby this number
ranges from only 3000 signatures which is equivalent to approx. 0.2% of
those entitled to vote in North Rhine-Westphalia to 3% of those eligible to
vote in Hesse. Thereafter, the competent authority (Ministry of the Interior,
the Government of the State or the State Parliament) – in the last instance
the respective (state) constitutional court – has to decide on the admissi-
bility of the application.15 After admission, a certain number of signatures
has to be collected within a prescribed period of time to make the petition
for a referendum succeed. Here, too, the signature quorums differ: 7% of
those entitled to vote within 4 months are required in Berlin, whereas 20%
of those eligible within just 14 days are required in Hesse and Saarland. It
is only after the aforementioned requirements are met that the parliament
debates on the draft bill. The parliament has three possibilities: Either it
completely endorses the draft bill, rendering the referendum obsolete, or it
completely rejects the draft bill, which leads to a referendum; moreover, the
parliament may reject the draft bill by submitting a counter-proposal, which
is to be voted on simultaneously.16
Table 1 summarizes the required signature quorums and time limits of the
first two phases and the approval quorums for the third phase of a referen-
dum.
and 49 NSLV; NSVAbstG), North Rhine-Westphalia (Art. 68 and 69 NWLV; NWVIVBVEG),
Saarland (Art. 99 and 100 SLLV; SLVAbstG), Thuringia (Art. 81–83 THLV; THBVVG).
13 Brandenburg (Art. 22 and 75–81 BBLV; BBVAG), Hamburg (Art. 50 HHLV; HHVAbstG), Sax-
ony (Art. 70–74 SNLV; SNVVVG), Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 41 and 42 SHLV; SHVAbstG).
14 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (Art. 59 and 60 MVLV; MVVAG), Rhineland-Palatinate (Art.
107–109 RPLV; § 60d–84 RPLWahlG), Saxony-Anhalt (Art. 80 and 81 STLV; STVAbstG).
15 The criteria of admissibility are analyzed in sections 7, 8, and 9.
16 For the potential misuse of counter-proposals as a means of splitting of votes, cf. section 10.
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Table 1: Formal Requirements for Sub-Constitutional Referendums in Two-
Tier-Models
Land admission phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
BW 10000 none 16.7% 14 days 33.3% none(0.10%)
BY 25000 2 years 10% 14 days none none(0.30%)
BE 20000 none 7% 4 months 25% none(0.70%)
HB 5000 none 10% 3 months 25% none(1.00%)
HE (128000) none 20% 14 days none none3.00%
NS 25000 6 months 10% 6–12 monthsa 25% none(0.43%)
NW 3000 none 8% 8 weeks 15% none(0.02%)
SL 5000 6 months 20% 14 days 50% none(0.60%)
TH 5000 6 weeks 10%b 4 months 25% none(0.24%)
a 6 months plus maximal 6 months, since the signatures of the application for admission are added.
b 8% within 2 months if signatures are collected in office.
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5.1.2. Three-Tier-Model
The three-tier-model differs from the aforementioned model particularly with
respect to the time of parliamentary debate. Whereas in the two-tier-model
the examination of admissibility and the parliamentary debate are separated,
they are combined in the three-tier-model. Thus, after the required number
of signatures for a Volksinitiative – Volksantrag in Saxony – (hereafter re-
ferred to as “popular initiative”) is collected, the parliament having decided
on the formal and material admissibility of the draft bill is obligated to de-
bate on the concern raised in the popular initiative whereby the initiators are
granted the right to attend and speak. As in the two-tier-model, the parlia-
ment has the possibility to endorse or to reject the draft bill completely or
to submit a counter-proposal accompanying the draft bill. If the parliament
opts for one of the two latter variants, it is upon the initiators to start the
petition for a referendum. The quorums required for a petition for a referen-
dum range from 80000 signatures (approx. 4%) within a four-month-period
in Brandenburg to 450000 signatures or 15% of those entitled to vote within
eight months in Saxony.
The respective quorums and time limits of each phase are summarized in
table 2.
Table 2: Formal Requirements for Sub-Constitutional Referendums in
Three-Tier-Models
Land initiative phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
BB 20000
a
1 year 80000 4 months 25% none
(0.77%)b (4%)
HH 10000 none 5% 21 days 20% none(0.82%)
SH 20000 1 year 5% 6 months 25% none(0.93%)
SN 40000 none 450000
c
8 months none none(1.11%) (12%)
a Inhabitants.
b As percentage of inhabitants.
c Art. 72 (2) SNLV requires a minimum of 450000 signatures yet no more than 15% of those
entitled to vote.
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5.1.3. Hybrid Models
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt pro-
vide for a “hybrid model” of people’s legislation. In principle, the people’s
legislation follows the two-tier-model (cf. section 5.1.1 on page 9) but as a
facultative step the procedure considers the popular initiative as a prelimi-
nary stage to the petition for a referendum (Franke-Polz 2005).
In Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt the initiators follow the scheme
of the two-tier-model if they choose not to go for the popular initiative, i. e.
they file an application of admission for a referendum (requiring 20000 sig-
natures in Rhineland-Palatinate and 8000 signatures in Saxony-Anhalt), sub-
sequently they must collect a certain number of signatures for a petition for a
referendum in due time (300000 signatures within two months in Rhineland-
Palatinate, 11% of entitled voters within six months in Saxony-Anhalt). In
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania the examination of admissibility is conducted
after the petition for a referendum is filed, i. e. the step of application of ad-
mission for a referendum is omitted. The number of signatures required is
120000 (approx. 8.5%); there is no time limit.
Table 3: Formal Requirements for Sub-Constitutional Referendums in
Hybrid Models (Two-Tier-Variant)
Land admission phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
MVa – – 120000 none 33.3% none(8.5%)
RP 20000 1 year 300000 2 months none 25%(0.66%) (10%)
ST 8000 none 11% 6 months 25%b none(0.46%)
a Following the two-tier-variant, the step of application of admission for a referendum is omitted.
b None if the Parliament submits a counter-proposal.
If the initiators choose to file a popular initiative, they have to collect 15000
signatures (approx. 1.06% of entitled voters) in Mecklenburg-West Pomera-
nia and 30000 in Rhineland-Palatinate (approx. 0.99%) and in Saxony-
Anhalt (approx. 1.73%). A popular initiative providing a drafted bill follows
the procedure of the three-tier-model, i. e. in case it is not fully endorsed by
the parliament, there is no need to file an application of admission; however,
the required signatures for a petition for a referendum still must be collected
in due time (signature quorums and time limits see table 4). However, one
12
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may also start a popular initiative that does not provide a drafted bill, for
which reason certain thematic restrictions do not apply. Since this latter
variant does not lead to a referendum, it is actually less an initiative in the
terminology used but rather a popular petition (see below section 5.3.1).
Table 4: Formal Requirements for Sub-Constitutional Referendums in
Hybrid Models (Three-Tier-Variant)
Land initiative phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
MV 15000 none 120000 nonea 33.3% none(1.06%) (8.5%)
RP 30000 1 year 300000 2 months none 25%(0.99%) (10%)
ST 30000 none 11% 6 months 25%b none(1.73%)
a Upon request the signatures may be collected in office within a 2 months period.
b None if the Parliament submits a counter-proposal.
5.1.4. Approval and Participation Quorums and Further Restrictions
With the exception of Bavaria, Hesse, and Saxony – and Saxony-Anhalt if the
parliament submits a counter-proposal –, all state constitutions provide – in
keeping with Art. 75 WRV – certain quorums that have to be met in order to
make a referendum succeed. Most constitutions require a 15–25% approval
quorum17; Mecklenburg-West Pomerania’s and Baden-Wurttemberg’s Con-
stitution require a 33.3%-approval quorum (Art. 60 (4) MVLV; Art. 60 (5)
BWLV); in Saarland, even a 50%-approval quorum is required (Art. 100 (3)
SLLV); Rhineland-Palatinate is the only state to demand a 25%-participation
quorum (Art. 109 (4) RPLV).18
Reflecting Germany’s federal structure, the scope of people’s legislation
within a state is limited by the state’s legislative competence. Furthermore,
all state constitutions preclude people’s legislation on financial affairs (cf.
section 9 on page 22). Saarland’s and Hesse’s Constitutions preclude people-
initiated legislation altering the constitution (on this, cf. section 5.1.5 on the
next page).
17 Cf. tables 1–4.
18 On the effects of these quorums, cf. section 7 on page 20.
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5.1.5. Constitutional Amendments as a Particular Case of People’s
Legislation
In principle, constitutional amendments follow the same procedure as the
people’s sub-constitutional legislation, although there are higher signature
quorums in two Länder19, the requirement of a qualified majority in seven
Länder20, and higher approval and/or participation quorums in all Länder.
The only state not allowing any constitutional amendment is Saarland (Art.
100 (4) SLLV). Another special case is Hesse, whose Constitution states in
Art. 123 (2) that any constitutional amendment has to be approved by both
the majority of the representatives and the majority of the voters. Since
there is no specific provision of the constitutional amendment by means of
people-initiated legislation, according to the prevailing doctrine, a people-
initiated referendum amending the constitution is not admissible (Dreßler
2005: 138ff.; Jürgens and Rehmet 2009: 206).
19 Berlin and Bremen.
20 Two-third majorities are required in Berlin, Brandenburg, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein.
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Table 5: Formal Requirements for Constitutional Referendums in Two-Tier-
Models
Land admission phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
BW 10000 none 16.7% 14 days 50% none(0.10%)
BYa 25000 2 years 10% 14 days 25% none(0.30%)
BEb
50000 none 20% 4 months 50%c none(1.75%)
HBd
5000 none 20% 3 months 50% none(1.00%)
HEe – – – – – –
NS 25000 6 months 10% 6–12 monthsf 50% none(0.43%)
NW 3000 none 8% 8 weeks none 50%g(0.02%)
SLh – – – – – –
TH 5000 6 weeks 10%i 4 months 40% none(0.24%)
a Mandatory referendums for any constitutional amendments (cf. section 5.2 on page 17).
b Mandatory referendums for amendments to Art. 62 and 63 BELV (cf. section 5.2 on page 17).
c In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
d Mandatory referendums for amendments to Art. 75, 143, 144, 145 (1), and 147 HBLV (cf. section 5.2
on page 17).
e Mandatory referendums for any constitutional amendments (cf. section 5.2 on page 17). However,
Hesse’s Constitution does not provide a people-initiated constitutional amendment.
f 6 months plus maximal 6 months, since the signatures of the application for admission are added.
g In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
h Saarland’s Constitution does not provide a people-initiated constitutional amendment.
i 8% within 2 months if signatures are collected in office.
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Table 6: Formal Requirements for Constitutional Referendums in Three-
Tier-Models
Land initiative phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
BB 20000
a
1 year 80000 4 months 50%c none
(0.78%)b (4%)
HH 10000 none 5% 21 days 50%d none(0.82%)
SH 20000 1 year 5% 6 months 50%e none(0.93%)
SN 40000 none 450000
d
8 months 50% none(1.11%) (12%)
a Inhabitants.
b As percentage of inhabitants.
c In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
d In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
e In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
f Art. 72 (2) SNLV requires a minimum of 450000 signatures yet no more than 15% of those
entitled to vote.
Table 7: Formal Requirements for Constitutional Referendums in Hybrid
Models (Two-Tier-Variant)
Land initiative phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
MVa – – 120000 none 50%b none(8.5%)
RP 20000 1 year 300000 2 months 50% none(0.66%) (10%)
ST 8000 none 11% 6 months 50%c none(0.46%)
a Following the two-tier-variant, the step of application of admission for a referendum is omitted.
b In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
c In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
Table 8: Formal Requirements for Constitutional Referendums in Hybrid
Models (Three-Tier-Variant)
Land initiative phase petition phase referendum phase
signatures period signatures period appr. quorum part. quorum
MV 15000 none 120000 nonea 50%b none(1.06%) (8.5%)
RP 30000 1 year 300000 2 months 50% none(0.99%) (10%)
ST 30000 none 11% 6 months 50%c none(1.73%)
a Upon request the signatures may be collected in office within 2 months.
b In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
c In addition, a two-thirds majority is required.
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5.1.6. Assessment of People’s Legislation Procedures
Since World War II, some 200 initiatives/applications for admission were
started (Jürgens and Rehmet 2009: 209). However, more than two-thirds
of these initiatives failed – either they could not secure the signatures re-
quired or they were declared inadmissible – before a referendum was being
held. Some 17% were completely endorsed by the parliament thereby ren-
dering the referendum obsolete, 8% gained partial success (i. e. ended up
in a compromise), another 8% finally made it to the referendum phase.
4% were successful, 1.6% gained a partial success (i. e. a counter-proposal
was successful) the remaining 2% secured a majority of voters but failed
to overcome the approval/participation quorum or the majority requirement
(Jürgens and Rehmet 2009: 213ff.). Combining the full and partial successes
in the parliamentary process and in the referendums, the victory rate sums
up to approx. 25%.
5.2. Mandatory Referendums
In some Länder mandatory referendums are required for (certain) constitu-
tional amendments: In Bavaria (Art. 75 (2) BYLV) and Hesse (Art. 123 (2)
HELV) mandatory referendums are required for any constitutional amend-
ments. In Berlin, Art. 100 BELV requires a mandatory referendum to be
held if an amendment to the constitution concerns the direct democratic in-
stitutions provided in Art. 62 and 63 BELV. In Brandenburg, a mandatory
referendum has to be held on the election of a constituent assembly and on
the adoption of a new constitution (Art. 115 BBLV). Bremen’s Art. 125 HBLV
requires a mandatory referendum to be held if Art. 75, 143, 144, 145 (1) or
147 HBLV is to be amended.21
The experiences with mandatory referendums are somewhat limited, since
only 19 were held between 1946 and 2007. With the single exception of
1995 (in Hesse), all mandatory referendums were successful.
21 However, the referendum may be avoided if an amendment to one of these articles is adopted
by unanimity in parliament (Art. 70 (a) HBLV).
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5.3. Other Forms of Direct Participation
5.3.1. Popular Petition
The state constitutions of Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North
Rhine-Westphalia, and Thuringia provide – besides the aforementioned in-
stitutions – a popular petition, an instrument which leads to a mandatory
parliamentary debate.22 Since it is not followed by a referendum, however,
the parliament has the final say. Here, too, there is a multitude of nomen-
clature: In Bremen and Thuringia it is called Bürgerantrag (citizens’ applica-
tion); it is called Volksinitiative – not to be confused with the Volksinitiative
as an institution of the three-tier-model – in Berlin, Lower Saxony, and North
Rhine-Westphalia; only in Hamburg it is actually called Volkspetition (popular
petition). To date, only 42 popular petitions were filed, which might reflect
the relatively high signature quorums (up to 50000 signatures (2.55% of
those entitled to vote) in Thuringia (Art. 68 (3) THLV)) in relation to its un-
certain effect.
5.3.2. Dissolution of Parliament before the Expiry of a Legislative
Term
Although there is no scholarly consensus whether or not a people-initiated
dissolution of parliament is to be considered as a direct democratic institu-
tion23, for the sake of completeness, its procedures shall briefly be outlined.
The state parliaments of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Branden-
burg, Bremen, and Rhineland-Palatinate may be dissolved by the people.
In Baden-Wurrtemberg, the petition for a referendum on the dissolution of
parliament requires the signatures of one-sixth of those entitled to vote; the
referendum is successful if it is supported by more than 50% of those enti-
tled to vote (Art. 43 (2) BWLV). The Bavarian Landtag may be dissolved if
the referendum – initiated on request of one million entitled voters (approx.
22 The same applies to the popular initiatives which do not provide a drafted bill in Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt.
23 Some argue that being the counterpart of elections – which undoubtedly are part of represen-
tative, indirect democracy – the people-initiated dissolution of parliament is an instrument of
representative democracy, too. However, since the dissolution of parliament is often linked
to the desire to change not only the representatives but also the policy they pursue, one
could consider the dissolution of parliament as a means of direct democracy. For a detailed
discussion on the dual nature of the people-initiated dissolution of parliament, see Neumann
2009: 235.
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10%) – is successful (Art. 18 (3) BYLV). In Berlin, a referendum aimed at
the dissolution of parliament before the expiry of a legislative term requires
the signatures of at least 50000 people entitled to vote as proof of support;
the referendum must be held if at least one-fifth of the people entitled to
vote agree to the petition within four months. The referendum shall become
effective only if at least half of those entitled to vote cast their votes, with
a majority in favor of early termination. In Brandenburg24 and Bremen, the
procedure of people-initiated dissolution of parliament follows the scheme of
a people-initiated constitutional amendment. In Rhineland-Palatinate, the
dissolution of parliament follows the procedure and quorums of the two-tier
variant of the hybrid model (Art. 109 (1) RPLV; § 61ff. RPLWahlG).
North Rhine-Westphalia provides for an indirect involvement of the people:
If a law initiated by the government is rejected by the parliament, the gov-
ernment may ask for a referendum. If the required quorum is obtained, the
law passes and the government has the option to dissolve the parliament.25
However, in case of being rejected by the people, the government has to
step down. Hence the submission for referendum is linked with a call for a
vote of confidence, which is a “creative way out of a political crisis between
government and parliament”, as Böckenförde (2006: 125) puts it.
The effect of the institution of the dissolution of parliament remains rela-
tively small and occurred only twice: In 1971, the “Liga für eine demokrati-
sche Verwaltungsreform in Baden-Württemberg e.V.” initiated successfully a
petition to dissolve the parliament in order to stop an administrative reform.
Although more than 54% of the voters voted in favor of the dissolution, it
failed to overcome the 50%-participation threshold (Wehling 2005: 16). In
1981, a petition for dissolution of parliament in (West) Berlin was more suc-
cessful. However, the parliament forestalled the referendum by dissolving
itself before the referendum was being held (Posselt 2005: 68).
24 The higher requirement of 150000 signatures to initiate a petition for a referendum on the
dissolution of parliament being the only difference.
25 Art. 35 (2) in conjunction with Art. 68 (3) NWLV requires a majority of voters and a partici-
pation quorum of 15%.
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6. Direct Democratic Elements on the Municipal
Level
Although the direct democratic elements on the municipal level will not be
discussed in detail, it should be noted that all municipalities provide – at least
some – institutions that allow direct participation of the citizens or residents,
respectively.26 The most common forms are the petition for a citizens’ refer-
endum and the citizens’ referendum (equivalent to petition for a referendum
on the Länder level and referendum, respectively). As on the Länder level,
on the municipal level, too, there are many restrictions. Given the small
degree of self-determination – in particular to the Swiss counterparts – the
most far-reaching restriction is that any petition for a citizens’ referendum
has to be within the municipality’s jurisdiction and its remit. As on the Länder
level, all municipalities provide some thematic restrictions, e. g. the financial
taboo. Moreover, Rhineland-Palatinate provides a catalog of issues which
are not precluded (Geitmann 2002: 167).
IV. Criticism on the Current State
of Direct Democracy in
Germany
The various restrictions of direct democracy and the many shortcomings in
procedure have met with considerable opposition, therefore, the following
sections outline the most important points of criticism on the current state
of direct democracy in Germany.
7. Prohibitive Effect of Signature and
Approval/Participation Quorums
It is undisputed that every means of direct democracy must be tested on its
social relevance. A feasible way to ensure the social relevance is to establish
a threshold, e. g. a certain number of signatures that have to be collected
26 Direct democratic institutions on the municipal level are discussed in more detail in Geitmann
2002; Schiller 2007; Mittendorf 2009; Kost 2010.
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before an initiative materializes. What is much more crucial, however, is
the height of those institutional hurdles. If the threshold is too high, little
to no initiatives will be started hence turning provisions of direct democracy
into empty promises. If the threshold is too low, however, this might enable
even the most marginal initiatives to materialize, what might cause the col-
lapse of a political system (Neumann 2009: 813). Eder et al. (2009) tested
whether or not higher signature requirements (and shorter time limits) had
an influence on relative initiative frequency in the German Länder. Their re-
sults support previous findings of similar studies on the U.S. states (Magelby
1994) which found that higher institutional requirements correspond to lower
annual numbers of initiatives.
The intention of approval or participation quorums in the third stage of
a referendum is twofold: On the one hand, the quorums should secure a
high legitimacy of the adopted act; on the other hand, the quorums should
prevent the tyranny of well organized, financially potent minorities (Hüller
2006: 829). However, high quorums – such as the 50%-approval quorums
Saarland and Hesse for sub-constitutional referendums, in Baden-Wurttem-
berg, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Schles-
wig-Holstein in constitutional referendums – set up virtually insuperable hur-
dles.27 Thus, the quorums required in today’s state constitutions provide
the very same incentives to abstain from voting as did the quorums re-
quired in Art. 75 WRV. These incentives, in turn, foster the intransigence
of the political elite and thereby undermine on key contribution of direct
democracy – the political discourse. Moreover, quorums make impossible
the non-participation in the political process, since every non-voter supports
the opponents by decreasing the chances of success of a referendum (Jung
1999: 881).
27 This is demonstrated by the following fictitious example: A referendum with a (high) partici-
pation rate of 60% – which is equivalent to average voter turnout for Landtag elections since
2005 – would require an approval rate of 83% to pass the 50%-approval quorum.
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8. The Requirement of a “Reasoned and Detailed
Draft Bill”
Besides the signature quorums required for initiation of either a popular ini-
tiative or a petition for a referendum, the criteria of a “reasoned and detailed
draft bill” is another formal criteria of admissibility. The narrow interpre-
tation of this provision by the State Constitutional Courts of Bremen28 and
Saarland29 was heavily criticized, since one could not expect a sufficient de-
termination from laymen (Wiegand 2006: 443ff.).30 This criticism led to a
change: Most constitutions nowadays grant the right to revise a draft bill
(e. g. Art. 50 (2) HHLV).
9. The Financial Taboo
A distinct feature of German direct democracy is the more or less comprehen-
sive exclusion of budget-affecting financial matters. These provisions trace
back to Art. 73 (4) WRV which excluded budget, taxation laws, and pay reg-
ulations from people-initiated referendums (Krafczyk 2005: 46ff.; Wittreck
2009). This catalog may be complemented by restrictions affecting fees
levied by municipal corporations (e. g. Art. 62 (2) BELV). The intention of
these provisions is to protect the budgetary prerogative of the parliament,
since this prerogative – being part of the system of checks and balances –
is one of the key functions of the parliament (Krafczyk 2005: 81ff., 155ff.).
However, since virtually any (draft) law has financial implications – and a
strict interpretation of this financial taboo would stop almost all petitions –
the provisions of the financial taboo are also in danger to exert a prohibitive
effect (Krafczyk 2005: 69). Nonetheless, the Saarland State Constitutional
Court31 followed this strict interpretation of the financial taboo by declaring
any people-initiated draft law having financial implications – be they pos-
itive or negative – as inadmissible under Art. 99 (3) SLLV.32 Other state
constitutional courts took a slightly more permissive position and defined
28 See decision of HBStGH of June 9, 1986.
29 See decision of SLVerfGH of July 14, 1987.
30 For a detailed discussion, see Przygode 1995.
31 See judgment of SLVerfGH of January 23, 2006.
32 However, due to the sui generis formulation of the financial taboo in Art. 99 (3) SLLV (“Über
finanzwirksame Gesetze […] finden Volksbegehren nicht statt.”), this position remained sin-
gular in the jurisprudence of the State Constitutional Courts.
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thresholds – ranging from 0.06%33 to 0.7%34 of the state’s overall bud-
get – below which referendums were deemed admissible under the provision
of the financial taboo (Neumann 2009: 399). The recent judgment of the
State Constitutional Court of Saxony35, however, has to be mentioned as
a laudable exception: In its potentially groundbreaking ruling it favored a
generous interpretation of the financial taboo and declared a petition for a
referendum admissible “as long as it allows the parliament to balance the
budget” (Neumann 2009: 403).
10. The Potential Misuse of Counter-Proposals
Counter-proposals – i. e. parliamentary proposals addressing the concern
raised in the petition for a referendum but dealing with the matter in a dif-
ferent way from that proposed by the authors of the petition of a referen-
dum – are provided in a vast majority of State Constitutions (Bremen and
North Rhine-Westphalia being the only exceptions).36 The counter-proposal
should not only work as a corrective to the direct democratic institutions by
strengthening the role of the parliaments but it should also ease the ne-
gotiation process to find a compromise and it should further facilitate the
expression of the voter’s will (Lombardi et al. 2008). Yet, where the voter is
allowed to support only a single proposal, the counter-proposal is in danger
to be misused as a means of splitting of votes (Wiegand 2006: 460ff.). In
combination with high approval quorums counter-proposals decrease signifi-
cantly the chances of success of a referendum. Therefore, some Länder (e. g.
Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt) provide the possi-
bility of multiple yes-votes. This solution, however, raises another problem,
since it might occur that several contradicting proposals may secure suffi-
cient support in a referendum. To avoid indifference in case of a double
(or multiple) yes-vote, Art. 76 (4) BYLWG provides for a “deciding question”
(Stichfrage): Following the Swiss model in Art. 139b BV, the voters may
vote in favor of several proposals and they may indicate the proposal they
33 See decision of BYVerfGH of December 15, 1976.
34 See decision of BVerfGH of July 3, 2000.
35 See judgment of SNVerfGH of July 11, 2002; for an appraisal, see Jung 2003.
36 The very same institution is acknowledged by the Swiss Constitution in its Art. 139 (5) and
139b.
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prefer if two or more are accepted which enables the expression of every
configuration of preferences (Albrecht 2003: 227).
V. Conclusion
In this last section, some suggestions are presented on how to improve Ger-
man direct democracy.
One of the main goals of this paper was to present an overview of the
various direct democratic institutions provided in the constitutions of the
Länder. The main reason for this being necessary is the Babylonian confusion
in terminology and procedures. Therefore, Neumann (2009: 805ff.) is quite
right to demand a terminological harmonization, since only sufficiently clear
provisions enable laymen to make use of their political rights.37
As Rux (2008: 909ff.) and Neumann (2009: 812ff.) argue, the implemen-
tation of the three-tier-model of people’s legislation in all Länder would be
desirable. The three-tier-model allows a parliamentary debate at an early
stage, thereby maximizing the referendum’s agenda-setting-power, which
is why this model serves best as a means of communication between the
“common people” and the governing elite.
For the same reason, signature quorums required in the first (initiative
phase) and in the second (petition phase) stage of a sub-constitutional refer-
endum should be lowered significantly – Rux (2008: 912ff.) suggests a signa-
ture quorum of 1% within a “generous” time limit for the initiative phase and
5%-quorum within three to four months for the second phase; in Neumann’s
opinion, for the first phase a 1%-quorum and a 5%-quorum without any time
limit for the second phase seems adequate (Neumann 2009: 813ff.). In con-
sideration of the issues raised in section 7, any quorums in the third phase
should be abolished – a view supported by Przygode (1995: 473ff.). Given
the importance of the constitution as a legal basis, Neumann (2009: 815)
– supporting the abolition of quorums for sub-constitutional referendums –
insists on higher requirements for constitutional amendments: He suggests
37 For the same reason Neumann (2009: 808ff.) further makes a strong point on unification and
simplification of the state constitutions: Institutions of direct democracy should be integrated
into the constitutions according to their respective legal nature (e. g. provisions on the popular
petition should be integrated to the section addressing basic rights; instruments leading to
the dissolution of parliament should be part of the section on the parliament; instruments of
people’s legislation should be integrated to the section on legislation etc.).
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a signature quorum of 2% for the first phase of a constitutional referendum
and a 10%-quorum in the second phase. For the third phase, he suggests
– with reference to the solution proposed by Jung (1999: 893ff.) – the re-
quirement of a two-thirds majority of those voting, thereby satisfying the
demand for a higher legitimacy without the perverse incentives approval and
participation quorums provide.
The financial taboo has to be abolished. Since virtually any law has finan-
cial implications – correctly observed by Neumann (2009: 821ff.) –, state
governments are tempted to challenge the constitutionality of a certain draft
law only to burden its proponents with a legal proceeding; the resulting de-
lay and the funds required might be enough to stop the endeavor entirely.
Moreover, the courts should not be burdened to decide a question which is
less a legal but essentially a political one.
In agreement with Neumann (2009: 815), the preservation (or the intro-
duction, respectively) of the parliament’s right to submit a counter-proposal
is supported. However, the danger of misuse as a means of splitting of votes
must be eliminated through the introduction of the Bavarian system provid-
ing for double (or multiple) yes-votes combined with a deciding question.
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